Ethiopia
TREATISE AND DISCOURSE
ON CULTURAL DEMOCRACY
Costantinos BT Costantinos, PhD
DISCOURSE ON CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY
Part I: discourse
on culture and democracy, Part II - Civil Society, Culture, Political Openness and Democracy, Part III –
ethnic self-determination, operative
history and avant-garde ideology
Abstract
There is
little appreciation of the dynamics of culture, as an ever-evolving set of
norms and institutions, influenced by external and internal factors. High or
low culture, it is disingenuous to base the case for an alternative view of
democracy on uniformity of cultures across the states and nations when the case
cannot be sustained even for a single state. Within
the Abyssinian cultural-ideological history, although Christianity and Islam
have co-existed since the turn of the first millennium, the heritage of the
Orthodox Church permeates the art, architecture, literature and moral perception
of the population. If religious orthodoxy was a prime preoccupation in former
times, ideological rectitude has been the essence of political life in more
recent times. Questions however arise: does
cultural democracy enter transition
processes in Ethiopia as an external ideology, constructing and deploying its
concepts in sterile abstraction from the immediacies of indigenous traditions,
beliefs and values? in the case of Ethiopia in particular, do ideas of democratization come into play in total opposition to, or in co-operation with
historic national values and sentiments? This is explained by process
openness or transparency can be analyzed at two distinct but closely related levels:
political agency and ideology. The
former refers to the full range of significant participants and their
activities and relations in political reform. Participants include potential as
well as actual and international as well as domestic actors. The latter might
relate to complexes of ideas, beliefs, goals and issues that can come into competitive
and co-operative play in democratic reform.
Key words:
political agency, ideology, culture, cultural democracy,
1.
Introduction
With the groundswell of political consciousness and opportunities for
political change that has emerged in Ethiopia, the discourse on cultural democracy
can and must take place to ensure the sustainability of democracy. It is also a
challenge, because, for a third time in a generation, we are faced with the
daunting task of building up new and equitable relationships; and hence the
litmus test to our ability to participate in reshaping the future of a nation.
It is also an opportunity for Ethiopians to marshal their experience and
knowledge to play a constructive role in national development. Ethiopians live
in an era where the environment has been marginalised to a point where essential
life support systems seem to have collapsed. Cultural make-up, community value
and organizational sub-systems of a once robust civil society have been
dismantled. This has bred a socio-entity that has wildly spun off their axis -
bitterly compromising traditional latitudes of survival that civil society
curved as niche for so long.
The paper seeks to explore the changing nature
of international debates about culture and human rights in recent years and the
implications of cultural democracy for the prospects of rights; amid the
turbulence of the divisions that marked the debate in the Cold War period. This
was dominated by the great ideological differences between liberal-capitalism
and socialism, and in which the contest was seen to lie in the competing claims
of the primacy of civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and
social rights on the other.
At the heart of the controversy was the role of
the market in the organization of economy and the well-known critique by Marx
of what he called the bourgeois rights. He also claimed to have established a
better framework for rights in which economic and social rights were ensured to
all people, enabling them to live a life of dignity. Abyssinian Socialist
states, including Ethiopia,
therefore analyzed rights in class terms.
Leaders hovered uneasily between these opposed views, reluctant to
disengage from the rhetoric of rights which had been invoked extensively in the
colonial period, but also conscious of the difficulties of establishing political
authority, especially in multiethnic societies, and increasingly driven to
restrictions of rights.
‘Developmentalism’ became a sort of ideology, for both socialist regimes
and those which operated market economies under the hegemony of the west, with
its undertones of control and authority.
The end of the Cold War changed dramatically
the context for the discourse of culture and human rights; widely represented
as the victory of human right and Western (Mainly American) democracy. The
discourse achieved a high salience. The
west defined its mission the extension of rights and democracy to other parts
of the world... followed by its dominance of Western culture. Soon Coca Cola
and Hollywood
became the icons of the new ‘Cultural Revolution’. Today, implicitly or
explicitly, the liberal model is often taken as the acme of democratic
governance. The target that a host of other Abyssinian countries set themselves
in the process of democratization is the attainment of institutions and
practices that have been the basic ingredients of our democratic tradition.
These include above all multi-partyism, independent judiciary, free press, and
popular sovereignty expressed through the legislature. But keen observers have
not been oblivious to the limits of this declared paragon of democracy, with an
“alternative, participatory vision of democracy” to achieve what has come to be
known as the “empowerment” of the common man.[i] To a
continent that has not been able to attain even the formal aspects of
democracy, limited as they might be, this groping for a deeper edition of it
may sound as a bit of a luxury.
2. Culture and politics: an introduction
This is no place for an extended inquiry into
the constituents of culture. However, in
the present debates, culture is treated historically. The exegesis of ancient religious or similar
texts is undertaken more in the nature of an archaeological exercise than a serious
examination of how and by what values people live now. ‘Culture’ has become a social construction
with little relevance to reality. In the
same breath as the strength and virtues of cultural values are extolled there
is a lament for the passing of old ways and the dominance of decadent western
culture, which prides itself on its oriental traditions, which enables a parent
to sue her/his children for parental neglect—the totally un-Confucian legalization of duties!.
Thus is filial loyalty measured in dollars and cents exacted, through a
judicial process that would shock Confucius9.
2.1.
What
Is "Cultural Democracy"?
The concept of
cultural democracy comprises a set of related commitments: protecting and
promoting cultural diversity, and the right to culture for everyone
in our society and around the world; encouraging active
participation in community cultural life; enabling
people to participate in policy decisions that affect the quality of our cultural
lives; and assuring fair and equitable access to cultural resources
and support. Much more can and will be said throughout Webster's World about
the idea of cultural democracy and how it plays out in practice; but these
principles are its essence. If you'd like more information about the origins of the idea of cultural democracy,
check out the essays in the core resources section.
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Ideology
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Psyche
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Faith
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Literature
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Issues
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The Arts
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CULTURAL DEMOCRACY
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Landscape
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Agency
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Action
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History
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Policy
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2.2.Culture as a Realm of Action:
Since culture
is our human creation, it is always subject to change. The powers-that-be would
like us to think of culture as a given -- that whether we like it or not, we
ordinary people can't change it in any significant way. We are awash in information
about the enormity of the world's problems, and this can be disabling. Overwhelmed
by the magnitude of racism, poverty, violence and other oppressive forces, we
tend to go passive -- or to strike out in usually futile individual acts of
rage. Thus the tyranny of those who benefit from the status quo is maintained.
Cultural
democracy is therefore a deeply radical idea. It is the ultimate extension of
the idea of democracy: that each one of us, each community, each cultural
minority has rights that deserve respect, and that each must have a voice in
the vital decisions that affect the quality of our lives. No one who commands a
disproportionate share of power in the world is happy to hear this idea put forward,
for it demands that they share this power with those who are locked out by the
current order: better to keep us confused and divided. Cultural democracy
inspires a vision of humanity which embraces us all. Each of us is as complex
and fascinating as the multiple factors and influences which have shaped our
own identities. Each of us is creative, gifted and potentially powerful. Our
communities are creative organisms that dynamically change in response to the
appearance of new people, ideas and circumstances. Cultural democracy calls
forth our most loving selves, illuminates places where healing is needed, and
challenges us to develop the best in ourselves, to be respectful of the
harmonious interrelations of all life on the planet.
Cultural
Democracy is not just about ideas, though. It's also about action. Despite the
depressing news brought to us by the mainstream media, people all over the
world are acting on their hopeful visions for themselves and their communities.
We want Webster's World to grow to incorporate them all. You will find many
practical suggestions here -- community projects, organizing campaigns,
theoretical explorations grounded in activist politics -- which reveal promising
ways of remaking the world according to the values of cultural democracy. There is little appreciation of the dynamics of
culture, as an ever evolving set of norms and institutions, influenced by
external and internal factors. There is
high culture and low culture, the cultures of the aristocracy and the peasants,
the culture of the military and the culture of universities (it is striking how
closely the armies of eastern states follow the military culture of the
west). It is disingenuous to base the
case for an alternative view of rights on a uniformity of cultures across the
states and nations of a whole continent when the case cannot be sustained even
for a single state.
Moreover, close connections between technology
and culture are disregarded as also the effect of the market on the
community. It is not as if these governments
are not a War of changes/globalisation which undermine the traditional values
of their societies shows that it is not these values but something else that
they are afraid of. Human rights
serve—to some extent—to mark off the public from the private, and to establish
a sphere of autonomy where the government may not interfere without great
justification. This sphere is a threat
to the presentations of governments to an all pervasive regulation of society.10 Another issue is ‘who interprets and
speaks for the culture’? The current debates are greatly impoverished because
on both sides the protagonists are politicians and diplomats (although very
recently the situation has changed with more academics becoming involved).
Government leaders who seek to represent eastern culture are themselves steeped
in western ways, its rationality and this worldliness’. They are incapable of discovering whatever
connections there may be between culture and rights/duties.
I do not deny that cultural factors influence one’s
view of rights, but culture is dynamic, not static, and responds to changing
material conditions. It is therefore not
surprising that some features that are today claimed to characterise eastern
societies have been present in cultures throughout the world at different
periods of history. No is ‘culture’
homogenous throughout society; particularly today—the result in large part of renationalisation—societies are marked by sharp distinction and
discontinuities. Just as an example, in
many new states, the culture of universities, armed forces and bureaucracies is
primarily ‘modern’, even western, while those of large segments of their compatriots
is rooted in a different political economy.
Diplomats across the world who earnestly and bitterly quarrel over the
universality and relativism of rights belong to the same culture, the product
of somewhat privilege background, university education imbibing similar
sciences and methods, more at home in cocktail circuits than in the heat and
dust of their countries. And similarly
their masters, the politicians, live in a common culture driven by hunger for
power and operating through intrigue and corruption.
Implicit in the above argument is that
perceptions of human rights are influenced by one’s place in society, so that a
society may not have a uniform view of rights.
The interests of hegemonic groups dominate the perception of rights,
establishing for them the claims of universalism; weaker sections develop their
own modes of resistance to the hegemonic view, and their alternative view of
rights. Thus interests of hegemonic
groups dominate the perception of rights, establishing for them the claims of
universalism; weaker sections develop their own modes of resistance to the
hegemonic view, and their alternative view of rights. Thus perceptions of
rights—identified as class interests—cut across societies (women, gays, trade
unionists, etc. in east and west share somewhat similar views on rights). There is no common core of rights that
hegemonic groups promote—but with the increasing role of the market across the
world, property rights are valued more than for example, the right of free
speech (with commercial speech and information given a higher status than
political discourse). The oppressed
value more the rights of association and participation.
Current debates, because of their political
context, are unlikely to establish the cultural foundations of rights. Culture no doubt influences one’s view of the
world and appropriate roles/relationships, but these differences do not
necessarily connote variations in the notion of rights. Although rights do reflect culture in some
measure, the relationship between the two is complex. Traditionally rights have been
ideas/instruments to fight culture—in the west as well as the east. The ‘public culture’ of the east has largely
assimilated ‘western’ values. At the outset, a study on the cultural democracy in Abyssinia in itself
poses serious threats to both the incumbents and the opposition as such
in-depth look into social and political process spawn people's empowerment and
may result in articulating the problems of the transition much more than what
the incumbent government or the opposition may be willing to admit. While this
is the general truth surrounding the transition study there are specific
impediments. Cultural democracy and good governance presents serious problems
because of short-comings and limitations of what the cultural democracy is.
3. Culture and the ideological heritage
3.1. Religious challenges
Although Christianity and Islam have co-existed in Ethiopia since the
turn of the first millennium, Ethiopia has customarily been known as a
Christian country (or in the more dramatic rendering, "an island of
Christianity"). This was because, enjoying royal patronage, Christianity
became the dominant religion and the dominant culture. As such, it has left an
indelible stamp on the history of the country and the psyche of its adherents.
The heritage of the Orthodox Church permeates the art, architecture, literature
and moral perception of that section of the population which has played the
dominant role in the country's history. Church and State existed through the
centuries in a symbiotic relationship, the former providing legitimacy, the
latter protection and endowments.
While there was little fundamental conflict between Churches and State,
the Church itself has been rent often times by internal controversy. Which was
the real orthodox doctrine of the Orthodox Church was not always so easy to
determine. Sectarianism was therefore an endemic syndrome in the Ethiopian
Church. The high point in doctrinal controversy was reached in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries when the Church was divided into warring factions
espousing divergent interpretations of the nature of Christ.[ii] Another
significant feature of Ethiopian Christianity has been the underlying tension
between the Church establishments on the one hand and monks and hermits on the
other arraigning the former for tainting itself too much with earthly dispositions,
including material possessions and political involvement.[iii] A
streak of millenarianism, conjuring apocalyptic visions of a perfect new world
rising from the ashes of the old, has thus run through Ethiopian Christianity.[iv] After
1991, this tension which had been a recurrent theme of Ethiopian religious
history has assumed a radical rift between the Church establishment and the
congregations, who find the sermon of a hermit more edifying than the benediction
of the patriarch.
The
coalition forces, which supplanted the Dergue in May 1991, had more authentic
Marxist-Leninist credentials, its leaders having been members of the student
movement in the early 1970s. Another difference between the Dergue and the
coalition forces is in the alacrity with which the latter sized up the
international situation in the late 1980s and effected a formal transformation from a communist organization into a broad
front fighting for "peace and democracy”. The Marxist-Leninist ideological
baggage informed the post-74 revolutionary process and continues to inform the
post-91 transition process in at least three important ways: the premium placed
on organization, the pervasiveness of a commanding economic policy, and the
perception of what has come to be known as the national question. We shall
treat each of these three aspects in turn. The swing to the left in the late
1960s was attended by the adoption of a presumably well-nigh infallible recipe
for organization, in its Leninist variant for the urban setting and its Maoist
one for the rural. At this time the Tigrayan Nation Progressive Union (TNPU)
was formed "in a very narrow way (it) started to grow and develop beyond
its scope. Nevertheless, it remained passive and its members were promoting different
outlooks; therefore, it could not fulfill the contemporary political
responsibility. Later, in 1974 as the question of political organization become an
urgent question of the struggle, a few students with Marxist-Leninist outlook
called a meeting of Tigrayan students in the university and agreed to establish
a strong political organization which can carry out the heavy burdens of the
time. The main task if this organization became the creation of fertile ground
for armed struggle."[v]
A cardinal feature of the recipe was the principle of "democratic
centralism" with the accent decidedly on the centralism than on the
democracy. This recipe was first tried at the student level, notably with the
establishment of the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) in 1966.
The Dergue discovered its utility and applied it to achieve the highest level
of mobilization - and regimentation - of society ever recorded in Ethiopia.[vi] Utilizing the same organizational recipe, the rural guerrilla forces smashed
the Dergue's gigantic military machine and seized state power in May 1991. The
same ideological baggage has permeated economic policy since 1974. It had to
its credit the most revolutionary land reform proclamation ever promulgated in
the Abyssinian continent. On the debit side, however, it ushered in a stifling
control of the national economy by the state. In the rural sector, aside from
the state control of land, it was characterized by measures ranging from tight
control of agricultural marketing to ambitious programs of collectivization,
villagisation, and resettlement. In the urban setting, it involved the nationalization of urban land and of financial institutions and state control
of wholesale and retail trade through its marketing corporations and the urban
dweller associations. The disastrous consequences of such all-pervasive control
of the national economy are all too manifest to require elaboration. But arguably
the most potent ingredient of the Marxist-Leninist ideological baggage has been
the principle of the right of nations to self-determination up to and including
secession. The principle was first aired at a student gathering in Christmas
Hall (the main student dining hall of Addis Ababa University) on a fateful
November evening of 1969. The vector of this pregnant idea was the intrepid if
rather adventurist stalwart of the student movement, Wallelign Mekonnen.
In 1970, the Algerian-based student exiles gave the student movement a
more comprehensive rendition of the problem under the pseudonym of Tilahun
Takele.[vii] The
term gospel is used here not without reason. For it amounted to little more
than a literal application of Leninist rhetoric and Stalinist dogma - rich in
polemics but woefully short on empirical data. And yet, the principle - and especially
its fateful rider, "up to and including secession" - became the true
test of any self-respecting Ethiopian Marxist. There is no doubt that,
particularly with respect to the oppressed and exploited southern half of the
country, the principle addressed a fundamental problem.[viii] But
in the rush to conform, few asked the crucial questions such as: What are the
nationalities and nations of Ethiopia? How did they evolve over time and what
was the nature of their mutual interaction? How precisely do they exercise
their right of self-determination? In the objective economic circumstances in
which Ethiopia found itself, need one push the principle to its extreme limit
of secession? In the end, therefore, the principle amounted to little more than
a legitimising instrument for any organised national elite that took up arms
against the central government.[ix]
4.
Governance traditions
Implicitly or explicitly, the Western liberal democratic model is often
taken as the acme of democratic governance. The target that a host of African countries
set themselves in the process of democratisation is the attainment of
institutions and practices that have been the basic ingredients of the Western
democratic tradition. These include above all multi-partyism, independent
judiciary, free press, and popular sovereignty expressed through the
legislature.
To a country that has not been able to attain even the formal aspects
of democracy, limited as they might be, this groping for a deeper edition of it
may sound as a bit of a luxury. On the other hand, the strengthening of civil
society that underpins the alternative vision of democracy is germane to the
discussion of cultural democracy process in Abyssinia. For the ultimate hope to
salvage the imperilled process seems to lie precisely in such strengthening of
civil society. Moreover, a direct and participatory form of democracy is
presumed to be the hallmark of the perceived Abyssinian pre-modern democratic
tradition, more specifically of ‘village democracy’. The pre-modern past has been
portrayed in diametrically opposite fashion: as an age of barbarism and
arbitrary rule (by colonialists), and as one of egalitarianism (by Abyssinian
nationalists).[x]
Both positions apparently suffer from selective presentation of the facts. The
former position needs not detain us here. The latter we have to address. It is
obvious that the idea of a uniform and Pan-Abyssinian egalitarian
socio-political system throughout pre-colonial Abyssinia is an untenable
position. In the first place, Abyssinia has seen empires (Aksum) and military
dictatorships (Tewodros, Yohannes, Menelik, Mengistu…) as well as for their
time village democracies in pre-modern times (Boran). Secondly, even the
so-called village democracies (Boran) had either an unmistakable stamp of gerontocracy
about them or were quite often disrupted by the intervention of powerful
individuals or groups relying on military prowess or invoking spiritual powers.[xi]
Ultimately, one is also forced to question the relevance of a
pre-colonial socio-political organisation to the contemporary Abyssinian
reality. For it is inconceivable that Abyssinia can go back to its past,
however idyllic it may be imagined to be. One writer has even gone so far as to
say that all attempts to relate the contemporary question of democratization to
pre-colonial Abyssinian society smacks either of naiveté or of ideological
manipulation.[xii]
At any rate, it is self-evident that Abyssinia in the 1990s is a much different
proposition than the Abyssinia of the 1890s or earlier. So much has changed in
territorial configuration, social and economic differentiation and the international
alignment of forces. Contemporary Abyssinia can only build on the cumulative
legacy of its pre- modern, colonial and post- modern experience.
It is a telling comment on the abstract nature of the whole exercise
that the two major nationalities/nations of Ethiopia, the Amhara and the Oromo,
have been cultural categories rather than territorially defined political
entities. Yet such was the power of the theory that even the Dergue was forced
to make some half-hearted concessions to it by establishing autonomous units in
its People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. After 1991, the student theory of
the 1960s and 1970s has become official doctrine. The absence of any critical
re-examination of the principle has meant that Ethiopia is now virtually set to
be the laboratory for its testing out, irrespective of the disastrous lessons
of the Soviet and Yugoslav experience. While within the realm of ideology, a
few words on Islam are appropriate. As indicated above, Islam was relegated to
a clearly secondary status in the past. A major handicap that Ethiopian Muslims
had suffered was their exclusion from the hereditary usufruct right to land (rest) prevalent in the north. As a
result, the Muslims had traditionally been forced to concentrate on trade. A
confused attempt by Lej Iyasu
(1913-16), the designated heir of Menelik, to redress the imbalance ended in
his deposition.[xiii]
During the period of Fascist Italian occupation (1936‑ 41), the new
rulers, in line with their policy of undermining the political prerogatives and
cultural advantages of the Christian Amhara ruling class, introduced policies
favourable to Islam. These are recognition of Sharia law, the use of the Arabic
language for instruction and in the media, and the building of mosques,
including the Grand Mosque in Addis Ababa. Most of these policies were reversed
after the restoration of the Haile Selassie regime in 1941.[xiv] A more
enduring, and this time indigenous, wind of change began to blow in 1974, heralded
by a mammoth demonstration of the Muslim population of the capital, with the
enthusiastic support of several Christians. The ultimate result of this popular
demonstration was the official recognition of Islam as a national religion, as
made explicit in the official celebration of three Muslim holidays and the
ascription of equal protocol status to the patriarch and the imam. In essence,
therefore, what has taken place after 1974, amplified after 1991, is not so
much the dis-establishment of the Church as the co-establishment of both
Christianity and Islam.
The above picture of classical Ethiopian society is admittedly grim.
With such a background, the prospects for democratisation are bound to appear
dim. What are the redeeming features of Ethiopian history that can dispel the
gloomy picture somewhat? What are the "bright spots" in this rather
unremitting image of authoritarianism and orthodoxy? It is easier to ask such
questions than to answer them. For the counter-currents strike one by their
futility or ephemeral character or their not so decisive import on the
political instance. Even if and when such counter-currents assume a more
durable shape, they do not always dispel the gloom cast by the two millstones
of Ethiopian history. With this note of caution, let us turn to look at these
counter-currents, focusing on three of them - proprietary and juridical rights,
regional challenges, constitutionalism, and the press. The inability of the
Emperor Haile Sellassie's regime to accommodate regional autonomy that the
separate, even if short, history of Eritrea dictated and the UN guaranteed
settlement of 1950 provoked the armed struggle that ultimately resulted in the
independence of Eritrea. Initially, progressive forces in Ethiopia espoused the
Eritrean cause as part of the democratic struggle against Emperor Haile Sellase.
As we have seen above, the student movement and the left even tried to subsume
it under the Marxist-Leninist recipe for the national question. The Dergue's
era exacerbated the whole situation and recast the question in the starkest of
terms: forcible union versus unqualified independence. Now that independence
has been achieved, the question still lingers on how much the achievement of
that objective has promoted the cause of democracy. Even if the authoritarian
character of the liberation movements can be explained by the exigencies of the
armed struggle, it remains a matter of considerable doubt whether a genuinely
democratic society can be built in independent Eritrea on those foundations.
5.
Civil Society Organizations and
local governance regimes - The Gada - a case digest
The Gada System, being the basis for all social, economic and political
relations in Oromo society, is the most pervasive institution among the Boran
pastoralist of southern Ethiopia. It is a function of three sub-system based on
differentiation of society in time. These sub-systems are the Gogessa
(patri-class), Luba (generation set) and the age-grade. Gada[xv] is
politically the most important grade. At this stage Lubas assume political
power while three other councils leave office. During this period the members
of Gada councils visit all parts of Boran territory to meet with the people,
perform ritual ceremonies at various shrines, settle disputes and convene
assemblies. After eight years in service the council members retire and enter
the Yaba grades handing over power to the incoming Roba Dori grade. Yuba is the retirement stage and constitutes five
grades. The first four are the most active life when the men act as advisers to
their successors. This is between ages 54 and 85. Beginning 86 years of age
through 93 is the last grade of Yuba stage marked by Gadamoji rites as the man
enters and leaves his last phase of service as the most senior advisor. Upon
completion of the Gadamogi grade he retires as Jarsa (old man) and is cared
for. Other institutions of less importance to the Gada system are the Heriya
and Kalu.
Apart from their political significance, the Gada leaders also have
important roles in resource management. While rules and regulations laid down
by the Gada tradition must be respected by all local level councils of elders,
any problem regarding resource use and maintenance which could not be solved by
these elders would be handled for resolution by the higher Gada leaders.
Likewise, the age-set Heriya which serves military purpose and the Kalu which
is a religious institution do not play any active role in economic management.
This is the function of local level institutions, the subject of the next
topic.
There are other forms of local voluntary organisation which the Oromo
use for insurance. There are idirs at
the PA level in which men and women are members. Idirs organise people to help each other during crucial periods
such as death and weddings. Women’s idir collect
butter for weddings. Idir also makes
easy to renew things if there are accident or other misfortunes. If a house
burns down all idir members have an obligation to construct a new house; if
cattle get sick or have accidents the members slaughter and divide the meat and
then they pay money to the owner at a fixed time. The usual amount for an ox is
200 Birr, for a cow 180 Birr, and for a young bull or heifer 80 Birr. Among the
Arssi Oromo most people belong to idir; membership may range from 45 to 140 and
the average contribution is 2 Birr per Month. Idir money will be paid out when
someone dies. If a husband or a wife of a member dies, 300 Birr will be paid to
the widower. For the death of a son a doughtier, the member will be paid 150
Birr; if the member was told the passing of close relative (merdo ) the rate
varies between 30 to 50 Birr. The idir of the Arssi Oromo women is
traditionally known as Wijjo. The
idirs of each balabala of the Arssi Oromo gives services and advantages to lineage
members when the members have to pay guma ( blood compensation), Gabara (bride-wealth) during marriage, and when imprisoned or penalised by a court. The
Wijjo is organised by the Arssi Oromo
women on the same lineage basis for the similar objectives. Sadete is idir for Muslims which is used to organise coffee ceremonies and
snacks (kurse).
There are credit
associations (equb ) which they use
for economic security at times, economic and social crisis. Every member pays a
fixed amount of money. There is judge to supervise and administer rules and
regulations. The sum of money collected from each member goes by chance to one
member every week so that the opportunity rotates every week to each member
until all the members have an equal’ chance.[xvi] The
money obtained from equb by the women are used either for their own private
purposes such as buying cloth for themselves or as additional expenses for
family necessities in the household. Their husbands cannot dictate how they use
the money. It is their right to use it for any thing they need. It can be
invested in the farm or education based on the willingness and decision of the
females. If the women want, they can discuss with their husbands how to use the
equb money. There are religious associations (Mahber) in which they prepare
feasts in rotation but also help each other during serious problems such as
crop failure, accidents such as fires burning houses and crops, etc. Members of
Mahber are mostly Orthodox Christians.
People from outside the PA can become members of idirs and Mahber but
not equb. Generally members of equb are local people. Idir is a crucial
association for wedding (marriage) and mourning. Like in all other places in
Ethiopia, Among the Arssi Oromo any person irrespective of age, sex, and
ethnicity or wealth difference can be a member of an idir. Mahber is
exclusively a religious association for the believers in Orthodox Christianity
in the name of Saints. The equb, and Mahber are associations through which the
people in the PA practice collective actions and reciprocity. Mahber
particularly can be considered as a form of redistribution. For the Arssi
Oromo, forms of collective action, reciprocity and redistribution, (with out
formal disciplines and regularity ), are practised through feasts that can be
prepared during sadaqa ( a feast prepared by wealthy person for the poor at any
time), Mowlid ( the birth day of a prophet Mohammed), and Arefa (Id Al Fatir).
References
1. Africa Confidential, (1994) 1 April,
1994, Vol. 35, No. 7, P.5,
2.
Asmerom
Legesse, (1973) Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of an African Society, New
York, Mohammed Hassen, (1990) The Oromo
of Ethiopia: A History, 1570-1860 Cambridge, pp. 10-16.
3.
Bahru
Zawde. (1992) Military and Militarism in Africa: paper presented at the Seventh
General Assembly of CODESRIA, Dakar, 10-14 February 1992.
4. COR 1994 Draft of the Ethiopian
Constitution Approved by the COR Miazia 25, 1986.
5.
Crummey,
D, (1975), Society and Ethnicity in the Politics of the Christian Ethiopia
during the Zamana Masafent, International Journal of African Historical
Studies, VIII, 2 pp. 266-78.
6.
Doornbos
M. 1991 Linking the Future to the Past, Review of African Political Economy,
No.52, p 53),
7. EPRDF (1994:a) Abyotawi Democracy,
Sene, 1986, No. 72,
8. EPRDF, (1994:b) Abiotawi
Democracy, June 1994, No. 72; Mahtot (a publication of the Amhara Peoples' Democratic
Movement, a member organisation of the EPRDF Coalition),
9. EPRDF, (1994:c) Abiotawi Democracy
No. 8 and The Position of Revolutionary Democracy on the Eritrean Question and
Unity P.23 May 1994
10.
Hutchful,
E (1992) The International Dimensions of the Democratisation Process in Africa,
paper presented at the Seventh General Assembly of CODESRIA, Dakar, 10-14
February.
11. Kinfe Abraham. (1991) Why the
Dergue failed: The lessons of failure (Part III Humanitarian), The Ethiopian Herald,
vol. XLVII, No. 254 26 & 27 July 1991, p. 2.
12. Norwegian Observer Group (1994)
The 1994 Elections and Democracy in Ethiopia: Report of the Group, Norwegian
Institute of Human Rights: Human Rights Report: August p.5.
13.
Osaghae
EE, (1991) A Re-examination of the Conception of Ethnicity in Africa as an
Ideology of Inter-Elite Competition, African Study Monographs, 12 (1) pp. 43‑
60.
14.
Ranger,
T (1985) The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe (Gweru,), p. 4.
15. Taddesse A.M. (1994) The Second
Woyane Movement 1975-1991. Thesis submitted to the History Dept, AAU. as a
partial fulfilment for a BA Degree in
History.
16.
Tamrat
Taddesse (1988) Processes of Ethnic Interaction and Integration in Ethiopian History:
The Case of the Agaw, Journal of African History, 29
17.
Tamrat
Taddesse (1989) Ethnic Interaction and Integration in Ethiopian History: The
Case of the Gafat, Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 21;
18. TGE (1992) The Transition Period Charter
Ethiopia .....
19. The Ethiopian Herald (1994) The
Down of Democracy, Wugagan, Ginbot, 1986, Special issue, and A successful
Transition, (editorial) June 4' 94.
20. Turton, D, (1972) The Social
Organisation of the Mursi: A Pastoral Tribe of the Lower Omo Valley, South-West Ethiopia, PhD
Thesis, Oxford,
p. 302.
[i]
This is brought out forcefully
in Eboe Hutchful, "The International Dimensions of the Democratisation
Process in Abyssinia", paper presented at the Seventh General Assembly of
CODESRIA, Dakar, 10-14 February 1992.
9 In Analect 2.3, Confucius says,
‘If you lead the people by means of regulations and keep order among them by
means of punishments, they will be without conscience in trying to avoid
them. If you lead them by virtue and
keep order among them by ritual, they will have a conscience and will reform
themselves’.
10 This point is made powerfully by
Vaclav Havel in his essay, ‘the Power of the Powerless’ reprinted in Living in Truth (London: Faber and
Faber, 1986).
[ii] For this see, Donald Crummey,
Priests and Politicians. Protestant and Catholic Missions in Orthodox Ethiopia
1830-1868 (Oxford, 1972), Ch. II.
[iii] Taddesse, Church and State, pp.
108-118.
[iv] Merid Wolde Aregay explores one
dimension of this phenomenon in his Literary
Origins of Ethiopian Millenarianism, Proceedings of the Ninth International
Congress of Ethiopian Studies (Moscow, 1988), pp. 161-72.
[v] Taddesse A.M. (1994) The Second Woyane Movement 1975-1991. Thesis
submitted to the History Dept, AAU. as a partial fulfilment for a BA Degree in History.
[vi] One of the major contributions of
Christopher Clapham's sober analysis of the Mengistu era Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge,
1988 is its documentation of the Dergue's achievements in this regard.
[vii] A pseudonym carefully selected to
symbolise two generations of opposition to the Haile-Sellasse regime, that of
the "father", Takkala Walda-Hawaryat, who battled the emperor with
singular determination until his death in 1968, and of the "son",
Tilahun Gizaw, who was murdered by the regime in 1969, in the wake of the
government hysteria provoked by Wallelign's paper, Entitled "The National
Question (`Regionalism') in Ethiopia", the piece soon became the gospel of
the Ethiopian student movement and the left.
[viii] And yet it was the Eritrean
insurgency, not the south, that provoked the issue. Ultimately and ironically,
the Eritrean problem was resolved outside the framework of national
self-determination which Tilahun Takele took so much pains to construct for it.
[ix] For the manipulative
potentialities of ethnicity, which in Ethiopian parlance is only known in its
elevated edition of "the national question", see Doornbos, p. 58.
[x]
Abdoulaye Bathily, "Pouvoirs et dynamiques de changement politique
en Afrique: de l'Ere pré-colonial aux Indépendances", paper presented at
the Seventh General Assembly of CODESRIA, Dakar, 10-14 February 1992, pp. 2-4.
[xi]
Ibid., pp. 4, 7-13; J.-F. Bayart, "La problématique de la
démocratie en Afrique noire. `La Baule, et puis après?'", Politique Abyssiniaine,
no. 43 (October, 1991), p. 8.
[xiii]
For the details, see Bahru, Modern Ethiopia, pp. 124-28.
[xiv]
Hussein Ahmed describes these
events in detail in his yet unpublished paper, Islam and Islamic Discourse in Ethiopia (1973-1993), paper prepared
for the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies; I am grateful to
the author for permission to refer to his paper.
[xv] Note
that Gada mean one of three things. It may represent the whole institution of
Gada, or one specific period of Gada leadership or the sixth stage of age-grade
system. It is distinguished in the context it is used.
[xvi] For example, for equb whose
members are 30, the chance for every member to get the sum of the money
collected each week from every member has to rotate for exactly 30 weeks. The
women who get money from equb have the right to use it for anything they need.
