Nascent
Spurts towards a
Nation of
Promises and Possibilities:
The
Nile and Gilgel Gibe III Controversy and the
Real
Intentions behind Ethiopia’s drive to Harness its Natural Resources
1. Introduction
In
1984, a famine began to strike Ethiopia with apocalyptic force. Westerners
watched in horror as the images of death filled their TV screens: the rows of
fly-haunted corpses, the skeletal orphans crouched in pain, the villagers
desperately scrambling for bags of grain dropped from the sky. What started out
as a trickle of aid turned into a billion-dollar flood. Irish Rocker Bob
Geldof enlisted the help of his fellow musicians dubbed his crusade Band Aid
and raised $140 million. The rescue effort was plagued by delays and
controversy, and some one million Ethiopians eventually died, but more would
have perished if the world had not responded so generously.[1] Such are the horrors of famine perpetrated by bad governments that the
global community had to assert that famine should be history. In response, to
this and later famines, The G8 resolution of the 2004 summit states, “With a
population of almost 150 million, recurring conflict, and an average per capita
annual income of less than $220, the Horn of Africa presents a compelling case
for attention. For more than two decades, nearly half of Ethiopians have
experienced some degree of food insecurity and malnutrition. Approximately five
million are "chronically food insecure", i.e., unable at some time in
any year to secure an adequate supply of food for survival.
Millions more face hunger or food insecurity in Eritrea, Somalia, and
the Sudan.[2]
We are united in our belief that famine
is preventable in the 21" century. Famine, food insecurity, and
malnutrition have many complex causes, and defeating them will require a global
partnership with governments, the private sector, and NGOs. We renew our
commitment to help build this partnership where more than 200 million people
remain threatened by famine and support
NEPAD and CAADP”. Ethiopia, a nation known as the water tower of North-East
Africa is the epicentre of famines. Surface water resources in Ethiopia flow in
12 major river basins. It is estimated that an average of 122.19 billion cu mt
of water is annually discharged from the Abay, Tekeze, Baro, and Omo-Gibe river
basins with an estimated 3.5 million ha of irrigable land.
Hence, the long-term objective is to
establish once and for all a nation that can ensure its citizenry human
development and human security. Nile and Gilgel Gibe are just two of the many
projects expected to contribute to this vision. Understandably,
the Ethiopia has now launched major economic and social rehabilitation scheme
to make famine history. Indeed, the economy has recently been growing at 10% and
provides opportunities to finance development within. New aid modalities
support the nation by generating national consensus on the Plan for Accelerated
and Sustained Development to End Poverty and to achieve the MDGs. Development and humanitarian
practitioners and pundits ensemble, believe that massive food production and
the energy required to fuel such development is the only way that the nations
can shed the stigma of famine. Controversies notwithstanding, we must put in
place well-researched studies on their impacts and advance dialogue forums to
address the potential gains of such projects and the human and environmental
impact of such undertakings.
2.
The Nile Controversy
2.1. Backgrounder:
The
Nile is a river shared by ten riparian States. Out of these countries, five are
among the ten poorest in the world. Their state of poverty, coupled with the
alarming population explosion and environmental degradation, necessitate the
development of the Nile Water resources by all riparian States. “The treaty for
the full utilisation of the Nile”, concluded between Egypt and the Sudan in
1959, divides the entire flow of the Nile between the two countries. Other
riparian countries, notably Ethiopia - a country with a population of 80
million (projected to be 120 million by the year 2025) and which contributes
about 86% of the annual discharge of the Nile - to date use only less than 1%
of it. Although the need has always been there, Ethiopia has failed to develop
its water resources to feed its needy population, mainly because of a lack of
the required financial resources. Policies of international financial
institutions like the World Bank, which have made it difficult for upper
riparian countries to secure finance for development projects without the consent
of the downstream riparian countries, have a significant contribution in this regard.
Bilateral sources of finance have not been any better. Foreign investments for
the development of the Nile waters have been almost out of the question. The
downstream riparian States, therefore, have maintained the right to veto the
development endeavours of the upstream States.
The
Nile status quo ante is such that
Ethiopia, whose name has almost become synonymous with drought and famine, is
condemned to be a bystander, while few downstream States have almost utilised
the entire water flow. Moreover, to make matters worse, they keep on introducing
new mega-irrigation projects even further. As a result, upper riparian
countries are naturally left with very little choice other than to resort to a
reciprocal measure of unilateralism. However, many in the Nile Basin, including
Ethiopia, believe that although sharing the Nile water resources may trigger
conflict, it surely is a better reason for cooperation. Ministers of water
resources from Nile Basin countries met in Alexandria, Egypt on July 27-28 to
discuss cooperation and a conclusive Nile River framework agreement. Following
are facts and agreements governing the use of Nile river waters.[3] The nine
Nile Basin countries attending the conference were Burundi, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement and the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and
Sudan:
The
former agreement was signed between Egypt
and Great Britain, which represented at the time Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika
(now Tanzania) and Sudan. The document gave Cairo the right to veto projects
higher up the Nile that would affect its water share. The later accord between Egypt and Sudan, supplementing the previous
agreement, gave Egypt the right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water a
year and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters per year. Both the 1929 and 1959
agreements have created resentment among other Nile states and calls for
changes to the pact, resisted by Egypt. The Cairo Cooperation Framework of July
1993: This framework was concluded between Egypt and Ethiopia, from which 85
percent of Egypt's water originates. Both countries pledged not to implement
water projects harmful to the interests of the other and consult over projects
to reduce waste and increase the flow of waters.
The Nile Basin Initiative:
Formed
in 1999, the initiative brings together Nile Basin countries to develop the
river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and
promote regional peace and security. The
Co-operative Framework was vehemently rejected by Egypt and Sudan on the basis
of their claimed legal and historical rights over the full amount of water, as
stated in the 1929/59 agreements. The two agreements were initiated by Egypt
and maintained through the decades to ensure non obstructed flow of the Nile
water to the country; the agreements were tailored to serve Egypt while ignoring
other riparian states, hence they acted as seeds of disagreement which were
growing beneath the surface and merged recently to create the present conflict.
Egypt and Sudan need to learn the lessons from past agreements and to analyze
how and why they were unfair, only then they will be able to co-operate with
other riparian states and seek a win-win settlement to the present dispute.
Analysis of the various clauses of the agreements, together with the consequences
of decades of their implementation shows that they are unreasonable, humiliating,
exploitative, unfair, represent a threat to water security, delayed economic
development, and represent an element of political instability. The belief that
the agreements are unreasonable is a common factor among all riparian states,
with basin wide opinion against the concept of water monopoly by the two
countries. The other six unfavourable features are suffered solely by Sudan.[4]
The Nile Basin Initiative Framework Convention:
This
convention has yet to be agreed by all Nile Basin countries. Talks in Kinshasa,
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 2009 over this new framework governing
the use of Nile waters failed after Egypt refused to sign the deal. Egypt has argued
that it would not approve any new framework that would deny it a right to 55.5
billion cubic meters of water a year and its veto powers over projects that
would harm its allocation. Cooperation on the development of the Nile is not a
totally uncharted territory. There have been efforts deployed by some to bring
about cooperation over the Nile-cooperative endeavours such as HYDROMET, UNDUGU
and TECCONILE. However, attempts at cooperation under these arrangements were
doomed to failure, mainly because they could not win the confidence of the
riparian States. Many, including Ethiopia, refused to be associated with such endeavours
for the obvious reason that they were considered to have the sinister motive of
institutionalising the unjust status quo in the Nile Waters, as evidenced by
the 1959 Agreement. Bilateral efforts of cooperation could not fare any better
either. The minimum degree of trust and confidence required for cooperation has
been in short supply all along. Nevertheless, not all is that gloomy; there
appears to be a flicker of hope in the horizon.
The
United Nations, the World Bank, and other international bodies, which were perceived
by some riparian States to be part of the Nile quagmire for too long, have decided
to be part of the solution. The facilitation by the World Bank and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) engendered two all-inclusive projects: the Nile
Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Nile Cooperative Framework. Because they involve
all the riparian countries, these projects are qualitatively different from
their predecessors. Given the degree of mistrust characterising the Nile,
securing the participation of all these countries in projects dealing with the
development of the Nile Waters should be considered a significant move in the
direction of cooperation. The NBI vision to achieve sustainable socio-economic
development through the equitable utilisation of and benefit from the common
Nile Basin water resources-is endorsed by all riparian States. They have even
gone beyond the statement of vision and attempted to articulate and translate
it into project portfolios. This attempt at defining and articulating the vision
and translating it into projects is a significant achievement. However, one
cannot lose sight of the fact that the task ahead is much more difficult and
complex.
It
is no secret that the unwritten but real strategy of NBI is to secure the
consensus of all the riparian countries on the less controversial issues by
postponing the key but difficult issues of the Nile to a future date or for
succeeding generations. There is no disagreement on the fact that the projects
under NBI essentially have confidence building as their main objective.[5] Institutionalisation
of cooperation on the Nile is imperative. With the view to address the legal
and institutional aspect of cooperation, “a Cooperative Framework Project (D3)”
was initiated in 1997. This pioneer, all-inclusive project, facilitated by
UNDP, is designed to have the “establishment of a functioning Basin-wide multidisciplinary
framework for legal and institutional arrangements”, and the “development of a
process with clear objectives that will lead to determination of equitable and
legitimate right of water use in each riparian country”.
In spite of the official
stance favouring the 1929/59 Nile water agreements between Egypt & Sudan,
the agreements are strongly opposed by most of the Sudanese people who
represent the silent majority. This public resentment was denied its right of
publicity by various entities, which worked hard to confine these voices and
ignore their existence. The present Nile
basin conflict reflects radical change in the way the Nile waters are managed
and shared by riparian countries. Behind these changes reside new mentalities,
attitudes and conditions which indicate that the change is permanent, and that
old days of inequitable distribution are gone forever. A new agreement,
Nile Basin Co-operative Framework, was signed in May 2011 by six riparian
states; DRC is expected to add their signatures soon. This action shows how
serious upper Nile countries are in ending the extended negotiations, which
continued for a decade in a revolving manner, without a hope for breakthrough
in solving the critical issue of water redistribution.[6]
3. Nile politics: From Tahrir to the Banks of the Nile
Fasil
Amdetsion[7] wtites
in a blog that “The struggle for control of the Nile exemplifies all the
features of great state rivalries: competition over resources, jousts for
geopolitical supremacy, and contests over the primacy of religions. Pitted on one side, are Egypt and Sudan,
which make exclusive use of the Nile; and on the other, the upper riparian
states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Acutely aware of its dependence on the Nile, from which
ninety-seven percent of its surface water is derived, maintaining a
near-monopoly over the Nile has been the principal preoccupation of Egyptian
foreign policy. Ever-vigilant, Egypt historically thwarted efforts to develop
the Nile through the three arrows in its quiver. First, Egypt claimed that archaic colonial
treaties justified the lopsided allocation of the Nile’s waters. Second, Egyptian diplomats dissuaded
international donors from providing multilateral or bilateral funding for
projects along the Nile. And third,
Egypt relied on the implicit—and sometimes explicit—threat of military force.
Winds
of change, however, began to blow along the Nile well before the demonstrations
in Tahrir Square. In 2010, after multiple rounds of negotiations, and over
strenuous Egyptian and Sudanese objections, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda
and Uganda (later joined by Burundi), signed a framework agreement for the utilization of the
Nile. The upper riparian countries extended
an olive branch to Egypt and Sudan by arranging for the treaty to remain open
for signature for a year, giving Egypt and Sudan ample time to sign before its
entry into force. Another significant development occurred this past March when
Ethiopia announced it would construct a mega dam along the Nile. These developments
constitute seismic shifts in Nile politics.
If these changes culminate in the successful creation of a regimen for
equitable use of the river, the dams and irrigation schemes to follow, will
impact the lives of the approximately 300 million inhabitants of the Nile
Basin. A basin-wide arrangement
governing use of the river could also serve as a model for resolution of water
disputes elsewhere.”
The Nile Basin
Initiative: Moving Toward Cooperation?
Despite
worrying geopolitical trends, several analysts insist that the potential conflict
over the Nile will be mitigated by the fact that that governments realize that they
have more to gain from cooperation than vitriol and confrontation. Kassian Stroh,
who has been at the forefront of those skeptical of conflict, envisions several
alternative arrangements to the current regimen such as the construction of
dams farther upstream in order to maximize water availability and more
efficient uses of the river.[8] This putative shift
towards cooperation supposedly manifests itself in a series of cooperative
arrangements by Nile Basin countries over the last four decades.[9]
The first
regional arrangement for cooperation was the 1968 Hydromet Project. The United
Nations Development Program funded the Project devised to exchange hydrological
and meteorological information between Nile Basin states, in response to three
years of flooding in the sixties. Stroh casts a positive light on projects such
as Hydromet, arguing that despite not tackling the thorny issue of equitable
distribution, they contribute to confidence building betweens states that can
have tangible benefits when substantive discussions occur.[10]
Growing calls
by Sudan and Egypt for a commission, encompassing broader powers, including the
total planning of the waters of the Nile Basin, were rejected by other riparian
states wary of Egyptian domination by virtue of its superior technical and
legal expertise.[11]
In order to deflect Egyptian and Sudanese pressure to establish such a
commission, East African states decided to establish the UNDUGU group,
comprising Egypt, Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and the Central African republic.[12] The group’s
sixty-six meetings at the technical and ministerial level over fifteen years
led to few if any tangible results and UNDUGU was abolished and reincarnated as
the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and
Environmental Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE).[13] This new grouping had a
considerably more ambitious agenda, articulating a “shared vision” program
that included training of water resource staff in riparian states,
socioeconomic and environmental analyses, promotion of power trading, and the
efficient use of water for agriculture.[14]
In yet another
fit of bureaucratic reorganization, riparian states established the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI), whose goal is “to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development
through equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin water
resources.”[15] Established in 1999, the NBI features a more streamlined
structure consisting of three supporting bodies: Nile-Com (the highest decision
making body of the NBI), NileTac (a body consisting of two senior officials
from each country, which supports NILE-COM), and an NBI Secretariat in Uganda.[16] For the first time, the
NBI operated in close conjunction with the World Bank and other donors, to set
up a trust fund to support projects across the Nile, which made it appear that
the World Bank had abandoned Operative Directive 6.50 in order to provide
financial support projects along the Nile.[17]
In 2003, the
Nile Basin states established the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Negotiation
Committee to recommend a comprehensive legal agreement for reallocation of the
Nile’s waters. Several analysts believe that these cooperative
institutions herald a new era of trust and collaboration over the Nile. They
also see signs of an Ethiopian-Egyptian rapprochement due to a 1993 Memorandum
of Understanding between the two states expressing the desire to utilize the
Nile according to “mutual interests”[18] and Ethiopia’s recent invitation of Egyptian hydrologists
and engineers to consult on the development of small scale dams on Nile tributaries.[19] Moreover, recent
statements from Egyptian officials, at times, have been conciliatory. For
instance, following several visits to highly impoverished communities living
along the banks of the Nile in East African states, Egypt’s Minster
of Irrigation declared, “We realized that we cannot stop the countries of
the upper Nile from developing the water. We understand each other now. We
realized the need for the development of each other.”[20]
4. Conclusion
In
1984, a famine began to strike Ethiopia with apocalyptic force. Westerners
watched in horror as the images of death filled their TV screens: the rows of
fly-haunted corpses, the skeletal orphans crouched in pain, the villagers
desperately scrambling for bags of grain dropped from the sky. What started out
as a trickle of aid turned into a billion-dollar flood. The rescue effort was
plagued by delays and controversy, and a million Ethiopians eventually died.
Ethiopia
is known as the water tower of North-East Africa. Surface water resources in
Ethiopia flow in 12 major river basins. It is estimated that an average of
122.19 billion cu. mt. of water is annually discharged from these basins. Eighty
to ninety percent of the water resources of the country are found in the Abay,
Tekeze, Baro, and Omo-Gibe river basins with an estimated 3.5 million ha of irrigable
land. Hence, the long-term objective is to establish once and for all an
Ethiopia that can ensure its citizenry both human development and human security.
Nile and Gibe are just two of the many projects expected to contribute to this
vision and Ethiopia has now launched major economic and social rehabilitation
scheme to make famine history. Hence, the economy has recently been growing at 10%
annually and this provides opportunities to integrate development with a strong
economy to finance it within. New modalities support the nation by generating national
consensus on the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
aligned to achieve MDGs and promote aid effectiveness.
Energy
supply in Ethiopia is mainly based on biomass resources that stands anywhere
from 80-90%, equivalent to 50 million tones of fuel wood. Studies made at
various time indicate that the country has an estimated 30 to 50 billion m3 of
natural gas, 1000 Megawatts of geothermal power and an unknown but substantial
quantity of coal and other energy sources such as oil shale. As regards alternative
sources of energy, the country has an estimated potential for generating 2.3
Terra Watt hours of solar energy and 4.8 million Terra Calories of wind energy
per annum. Although it is believed that enormous amounts of energy can be generated
from the various energy sources in the country, the sources that are most used
(above 95%) are wood and other biomass products. Due to poverty, the majority
of the population cannot afford to buy and/or construct the equipment required
for harnessing alternative sources of energy and the biomass resources are being
increasingly depleted. As a result of the deforestation, the silting up of dams
and the consequent reduction in reservoir capacity has undermined the
generation of hydropower energy. Biomass resources such as dung are not being
ploughed back into the land as they are used as energy.[21]
The
Nile negotiations should accord equitable entitlement to all riparian States. A
lot of progress has been registered under the Nile Cooperative Framework
Project over the last three years. The panel, composed of three experts from
the Nile riparian countries, has managed to identify, despite the prevailing
sense of mistrust, key issues and articulate their differences. Attempts on attaining
convergence on some of the important issues have been made. Ways and means to
get around dividing issues were also explored. It is encouraging to note that
the panel of experts has developed a draft Cooperative Framework Agreement,
understandably marred by many square brackets. The fact that a new agreement
has been signed by five states is a step forward.
The differences between these
States, especially Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia, on some of the important
provisions of the draft agreement may be resolved if the experts' work can be
complemented by the goodwill, determination and courage of the political
leaderships of the riparian States and, of course, the positive outlook of the
international community.
Famine
prevention requires development in the Nile by all riparian States, while
addressing more systematically to the limit the impact of the reduction of the
Nile discharge. Cooperation, therefore, may mean less water for them and, as
such, it is not surprising that non-cooperation has remained the Nile modus
operandi for too long. The question is “Is this monopoly status sustainable?”
Countries like Ethiopia have reached the stage where they are left with no
choice other than to utilise the Nile Waters for irrigation, hydro-power
generation and other population needs. Confrontation has been the state of
affairs that has characterised the Nile for no less than a century. The outcome
has been insecurity, which has almost become the Nile way of life. Cooperation
has been denied a chance by some who have been under the mistaken impression
that the unjust Nile status quo could be sustainable. Now it should be clear to
all that the only viable alternative is cooperation. Nile cooperation is not a
zero-sum game; it takes the goodwill and resolve of all riparian States to
realise the development of the Nile Waters to benefit all.
Having surveyed legal, geopolitical,
and normative arguments, it is clear that the present hegemonic allocation of
the Nile waters is unsustainable. The absence of conflict does not guarantee
peace in perpetuity. A confluence of factors, ranging from the environmental to
the demographical, accompanied by fiery political rhetoric, suggest that a
tipping point is about to be reached. The key question, therefore, is how to
remedy a status quo that is untenable in the end. Overcoming the present
impasse will require more than just the occasional small-scale dam and
household water tanks in the Ethiopian highlands[22] or training for water
specialists under the aegis of the NBI;[23] it will require a
comprehensive overhaul of the entire Nile Basin regime. Proposals for change
must be predicated upon an approach that recognizes the multifaceted, multidimensional
and symbiotic nature of the challenges giving rise to the flawed regime
presently determining allocation of the Nile’s waters. Alternative frameworks
must fuse legal, political, socio-economic, emotive (i.e.,
popular and nationalist sentiments), and environmental considerations in order
to be successful. A review of the current hydraulic systems regulating storage
and distribution would mark an important beginning. On the hydraulic front, for
instance, current shortages will certainly be mitigated should reservoirs be
built further upstream.[24] In fact, this concept is
not an entirely new one, for it was proposed by the British in the early
twentieth century and its benefits recognized by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
in the 1960s.[25]
Building large-scale dams in the Blue Nile Basin, within Ethiopian territory,
though it may revive Egyptian fears of vulnerability, would benefit all sides.
Tangible benefits would be delivered
to upper and lower riparian states because the cooler Ethiopian highlands are
less susceptible to the evaporation which occurs in the more arid Egyptian
climate. It is estimated that the Lake Nasser Reservoir loses up to ten billion
cubic meters of water a year to evaporation, a figure which would be cut by
half if the reservoir were to have been built in the Ethiopian highlands.[26] Savings would be even
more dramatic if dam building took place in conjunction with intensified water
conservation methods including recycling waste water, shifts in cropping
patterns, and more efficient use of water for irrigation purposes. Implementing
such proposals would deliver more water for consumption, thus catering to
socio-economic concerns. But it might also do so in the most efficient manner
possible, thereby assuaging environmental concerns.[27] Mitigating tensions over
the Nile is also unlikely unless adequate attention is paid to economic issues.
Government officials and policymakers will have to focus on value-creating solutions
and be willing to support these solutions within their respective
constituencies. New dams in upper riparian states will not only maximize available
water but may also stem potential conflict if such dams become the cornerstone
of a regional commercial and interdependent power supply system.
In other words, the current system
might be altered to include a commercial element. In exchange for greater
control over resources originating within their borders, upper riparian states,
for example, might sell pre-determined amounts of water to lower riparian
states. One alternative wide-ranging cooperative framework might include the
creation of a true system of integrated resource management dealing with issues
of resource allocation, but also, broader environmental, social, economic and political
issues.[28] A possible model would be
the Tennessee Valley Authority of the 1930s and its tackling of resource
allocation along with flood control, malaria prevention, reforestation, or
erosion control.[29]
A revamped Nile Basin Initiative—or a new organization comprising riparian states—could
take on such responsibilities.
Yet execution of such hydraulic and
economic reforms would have to be accompanied by a wide-ranging legal review of
the 1929 and 1959 Agreements. Revision of those controversial agreements will
mean that states will have to adopt more flexible negotiating positions. “Strategies,…such as
excessive demands, commitments to unalterable positions or threats, could never
achieve their objectives.”[30]
Moreover, reliance on archaic rules
of customary law will have to be put aside. States involved in negotiating
equitable allocations of the Nile’s waters will have to do so in the context of emerging jurisprudence
recognizing the right to access to water and sovereignty over natural
resources. Thinking in such holistic terms will require a change of heart and a
more multilateral approach to development of the Nile waters. If conciliatory
gestures are not met half way, however, upper riparian states will have to work
more decidedly to reverse the current regime sanctioning inequitable
allocations. This would require greater multilateral coordination at the
international level in order to obtain funding for developmental projects, and
in order to receive political and media support for the plight of upper riparian
states. Continued scorpion-like persistence in undertaking unilateral actions,
rather than multilateral coordination, whether between upper riparian and lower
riparian states, or solely between upper riparian states in the face of
Egyptian and Sudanese intransigence will most likely in the end injure
populations which can only stand to benefit if they coordinate their efforts at
exploitation of the Nile’s abundant bounties.
Next steps:
Massive
food production and the energy required to fuel such development is the only
way that the nation can shed the stigma of famine and poverty. Controversies
notwithstanding, well-researched studies on the impacts of dams must be
undertaken to advance dialogue forums to address the potential gains of such
projects and the human and environmental impact of such undertakings that will
enable the process to
·
involve the local populace
(through their local organisations) that
will be affected by the dam in the discourse on the utility and impact of the
dam;
·
listen to the environmental
activists of their concerns and convince those who are sceptical about the EIA
by undertaking further evaluations;
·
host a roundtable for dialogue
among the sceptics and the researchers to convince them the that the human and
environmental impacts will not adversely affect the intended purpose of the
construction so the dam; and
·
ensure that all recommendations of
the EIA are implemented correctly by setting up a monitoring system that checks
on progress;
Understandably,
Ethiopia needs to utilise its hydroelectric and irrigation potential to be able
to sustain any form of development in Africa’s second largest populated nation.
It aims to create quickly a strong infrastructure base and certain key
production capacity (e.g., in hydropower, cement, and export industries in
general) so that in time, growth of imports will moderate and exports will
begin to narrow the trade deficit.[31] While
the concerns of the human and physical environment must be addressed as a
matter of urgency, it is also important that such development take a course of
inclusion and dialogue so that all voices are heard in a democratic environment.
This will allow for the projects such as Gilgel Gibe III to proceed without a
hitch but also allow the project holders to raise resources without the damage
that will be imparted by concerned citizens and international civil society
organisations.
On the other hand, international
lobby must also refine its advocacy so that protests that are not based on
scientific facts and solid evidence and impact assessment evaluation do not hamper
Africa’s fledgling development projects.
In
fact, a balance must be created between what is logically tenable in terms of
the incessant dependency on international charity and ‘unsubstantiated’
militancy against such development projects, without which, that dependence
will not be addressed. Notwithstanding economic, social, cultural, religious
and political and sundry but insurmountable obstacles and impediments emanating
from internal structural obstructions, attempts must be made to identify the
impediments and the need for strategic partnership and alliances with civil society.
It can be done. Yes it can be done. A skilled and committed state and
international civic leadership can mitigate conditions that are hostile to
achieving such synergy between state and society and equitable growth and prosperity.
References and endnotes
[1] Serrill, MS, TIME -CNN (1987) Famine: Hunger stalks Ethiopia
once again -- and aid groups fear the worst
[2] The White House, (2004) Ending Famine in
Horn of Africa: Ending the Cycle of Famine in the Horn of Africa, Raising Agricultural Productivity, and Promoting
Rural Development in Food Insecure Countries
[3]FACTBOX Nile river agreements and issues,
Alexandria, Egypt Mon Jul 27, 2009 12:47pm EDT , Source:
Reuters, Nile Basin Initiative, Egypt State Information Service, Maha El Dahan,
James Jukwey, DIARY - Egypt/Sudan
[4] Mustafa A. Mukhtar (2010) Why Sudanese public opinion opposes the Nile Water Agreements? http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35863
accessed August 20, 2010
[5] Questions,
therefore, arise on whether these “confidence-building” measures stand a chance
to improve the chronic state of mutual mistrust and suspicion that have
characterised the development of the Nile Waters. Would NBI help the riparian
States address the unjust status quo prevailing over the Nile? The failure of
NBI would mean more mistrust and suspicion between the riparian States,
frustration on the part of the facilitators, and a full-fledged unilateralism,
which would be a recipe for a conflict over the utilisation of the Nile Waters.
The success of NBI, on the other hand, would mean security and sustainable
supply for the downstream States and a chance for development for the upstream
States.
[7] Fasil
Amdetsion, (2007) Scrutinizing
the Scorpion
Problematique: Arguments
in Favor of the Continued Relevance of International Law and a
Multidisciplinary Approach to Resolving the Nile Dispute, Texas International Law Journal, Vol., 44:1,
Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School,
[9] See id. at 120 (describing the Hydromet
Project, which provided for the exchange of geological, meteorological, and
hydrological data). In Fasil Amdetsion, (2007)
[11]R.O. Collins, History, Hydropolitics and the Nile: Nile Control, Myth or Reality?, in Nile: Sharing A Scarce Resource 126 (P.P. Howell
& J.A. Allen eds., 1994). In Fasil Amdetsion, (2007)
[12] Yosef
Yacob, From UNDUGU to the Nile Basin
Initiative: An Enduring Exercise in Futility, Addis Tribune, Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.tigrai.org/News/Articles2004/TheNileByYacob2.html.
In Fasil Amdetsion, (2007)
[17] See id. (“As a result of World Bank pressure, Egypt has
agreed to shift in its foreign policy over the Nile water issue.”). In Fasil
Amdetsion, (2007)
[19] (much to
the chagrin of several Ethiopians who view this consultative process prior to
construction as tantamount to a de facto endorsement of the 1959 agreements)
Framework for General Co-Operation Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and
Ethiopia, Egypt-Eth., July 1, 1993, available at www.ecolex.org/serverz.php/libcat/docs/bilateral/en/tre001701en.pdf.306,
.
[21] Environmental Protection Agency, (2003) State
Of The Environment Report In Ethiopia,
Addis Abeba
[23] See The Nile Basin Initiative: Water Resources Planning and Management, available at http://wrpm.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemid=46,
(describing the project and repeating
the need to develop “human capacity”).
[27] Id. at 125.336. Mark Svendsen, International Food Policy Research Institute,
Integrated Management Of Water In River Basins (2001), http://www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focus09/focus09_13.asp.
[28] Tennessee Valley Authority, From the
New Deal to a New Century: A Short History of TVA,
http://www.tva.gov/abouttva/history.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009)
[29] Alice Landau, Analyzing International Economic Negotiations:
Towards a Synthesis of Approaches, 5 INT’L NEGOTIATION 1, 11 (2000).
[31] Ken Ohashi (2009) Sustaining Growth Ethiopessimism?, World Bank,
Fortune:Addis Ababa
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