Wednesday, 27 August 2014

The Nile Conundrum: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt Getting to the bottom of the ‘Historical Water Rights’ Impasse & Crafting a win-win Diplomacy



The Nile is a river shared by ten riparian States that are among the ten poorest in the world and that necessitate the development of the Nile Water resources by all riparian States. The 1929 agreement was signed between Great Britain (albeit representing its colony, Egypt) and Great Britain, which also represented at the time Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Sudan. The document gave Cairo (under colonial administration by London) the right to veto projects higher up the Nile that would affect its water share. The treaty for the full utilization of the Nile, concluded between Egypt and the Sudan in 1959, divides the entire flow of the Nile between the two countries. Other riparian countries, notably Ethiopia - a country with a population of 90 million today and which contributes about 86% of the annual discharge of the Nile - to date use only less than 1% of it.
Ethiopia, a nation known as the water tower of North-East Africa is the epicenter of famines. Surface water resources in Ethiopia flow in 12 major river basins. It is estimated that an average of 122.19 billion cubic meters of water is annually discharged from the Abay (Nile), Tekeze, Shebelle, Baro and Omo-Gibe river basins with an estimated 3.5 million ha of irrigable land. Hence, the long-term objective is to establish once and for all a nation that can ensure its citizenry human development and human security.
In 1984, a famine began to strike Ethiopia with apocalyptic force. Westerners watched in horror as the images of death filled their TV screens: the rows of fly-haunted corpses, the skeletal orphans crouched in pain, the villagers desperately scrambling for bags of grain dropped from the sky. What started out as a trickle of aid turned into a billion-dollar flood. (Serrill, MS, TIME –CNN, 1987) For more than two decades, nearly half of Ethiopians have experienced some degree of food insecurity and malnutrition. Approximately five million are chronically food insecure, i.e., unable at some time in any year to secure an adequate supply of food for survival.
Ethiopia could not develop its water resources to feed its needy population, mainly because of policies of international financial institutions (IFIs), augured on British colonial dictat, which have made it difficult for upper riparian countries to secure finance without the consent of Egypt. Foreign direct investments for the development of the Nile waters have been almost out of the question. The downstream riparian States, therefore, have maintained the right to veto the development endeavors of the upstream States. The Nile status quo was such that Ethiopia, whose name has almost become synonymous with drought and famine, is condemned, while two downstream States have almost utilized the entire water flow. Moreover, Sudan and Egypt introduce new mega-irrigation projects even further. As a result, upper riparian countries are naturally left with very little choice other than to resort to a reciprocal measure of unilateralism even if as feared by many that it may trigger conflict, it becomes a better drive for collaboration (Milas, 2013)
 For more than five decades Egypt’s political leaders have claimed ‘historic rights’ to control of the Nile waters, punctuated by threats of war against any upstream country that might attempt to build dams or water infrastructure on the river. This became a prominent feature of Egypt’s Nile policy after the construction of the Aswan High Dam by the Soviet Union. The late President Anwar Sadat realigned his country with the West, made peace with Israel and announced that the only thing that could bring Egypt into war again would be if any country threatened Egypt’s control of the Nile waters. Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel opened Cairo’s way to aid agreements with the United States and to Egyptian access to strategic positions in the World Bank and other IFIs, which they could influence against lending for water infrastructure in upstream states without the agreement of downstream states. To build it, they would need loans from the IFIs, which were unlikely to be available without Egypt’s agreement, especially in view of propaganda that such loans might possibly lead to war. Now however, there are many other sources of funding, like China. (Ibid)
Now that Ethiopia is building The Renaissance Dam expected to produce around 6000 megawatts of electricity in the Blue Nile Gorge near the border with Sudan, Cairo is nervous that the waters of the Nile might be in jeopardy. While Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has tried to dampen down embarrassing suggestions that Egypt might use military power over disagreements concerning the Nile waters, the hard-talk from the Egyptian side. This is despite the fact that the report of an independent panel of experts from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan had concluded that the hydropower dam would not significantly reduce the flow of water reaching Sudan and Egypt, as the water merely has to pass through the dam’s turbines and come out the downstream side to produce hydroelectricity.
President Museveni has sternly stressed that the biggest threat to the Nile is continued under-development in the tropics i.e. lack of electricity and lack of industrialization. On account of these two, peasants cut the bio-mass for fuel and invade the forests to expand primitive agriculture. Here in Uganda, the peasants destroy 40 billion cubic metres of wood per annum for firewood. They also invade the wetlands to grow rice, he noted. This interferes with the transpiration that is crucial for rain formation. Our experts have told me that 40 percent of our rain comes from local moisture - meaning from our lakes and wetlands. Ironically, said Museveni, the Egyptians wanted to drain the wetlands in South Sudan through the Jonglei canal. It was one of the causes for the people of South Sudan to wage war against Khartoum, which was collaborating with Egypt’s misguided and dangerous policies of that time (Allafrica.com, 2013)


http://issuu.com/costantinos/docs/the_nile_conundrum__ethiopia_and_eg,

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